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MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
TORT LIABILITY OF A PARENT TO MINOR
UNEMANCIPATED CHILD FOR WILFUL
AND WANTON ACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well settled in the law that, barring any defenses, one can
recover a judgment for the damages resulting from an intentional
interference with his person. Thus, let us suppose that A is sitting
on a park bench minding his own business, when B, a stranger, ap-
proaches and without cause gives A a severe blow on the side of the
head, which blow causes serious injuries to A. There is no question
but that A is entitled to recover damages from B in a civil action.
The reason for the recovery being the fact that A has a legally
recognized interest of freedom from intentional interferences with
his person and B has a legal duty not to interfere with this interest.
B's breach of this duty renders him liable to A for any harm which
resulted as a result thereof.
There is little room for argument as to B's liability in the afore-
mentioned stiuation. However, by adding the fact that A is the un-
emancipated minor son of B the entire complexion of the situation
changes and the issue arises as to whether or not the relationship
of parent and child will in any way affect B's liability. This, basically,
is the problem involved in the case of a wilful and wanton injury to
a minor child, which injury was caused by its parent. More specifical-
ly, are the parent's acts privileged, and if so, to what extent?
II. COMMON LAW VIEW As To THE PARENTS LIABILITY
Much confusion exists as t o the common law view on parental
liability. The law has developed as a matter of conjecture and in-
ference. The cleavage of opinion as to actual common law rule
is exemplified by the following views. The view of some courts has
been:
"There has never been a common-law rule that a child could
not sue its parent. It is a misapprehension of the situation to
start with that idea and to treat the suits which have been
allowed as exceptions to the general rule. The minor has the
same right to redress for wrongs as any other individual."'
Other courts have stated:
"At common law, the right of the father to the control and
custody of his infant child grew out of the corresponding duty
on his part to maintain, protect and educate it. . . In case
parental power was abused, the child had no civil remedy
against the father for the personal injuries inflicted." 2
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, at 353, 150 Atl. 905, at 906 (1930); See
also: Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 1, at 2, 77 A.2d 923, at 924 (1951) ; Briggs
v. City of Philadelphia, 112 Pa. Super. 50, at 51, 170 Atl. 871, at 872 (1934).
2McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). See also: Red-
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It is most obvious that these views cannot be reconciled. While both
are quite positive in their assertion as to the common law rule, neither
has cited any authority for the position which they have taken.
The earlier text writers have expressed varying and inconsistent
views on the subject. In this specific aspect of the parent-child
relationship, the first, and perhaps the most elementary, premise ad-
vanced by such writers is, "Thy father may correct the child in a
reasonable manner. . . ."3 However, when the correction exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness, the question arises as to whether the
appropriate remedy is civil or criminal. While all appear to admit
that the father may be criminally liable for malicious acts injurious
to the child, there is a vast area of disagreement as to whether or
not there exists any civil liability for such acts.
One view was that the child had no civil remedy:
"... if he plainly exceeds all bounds, he is liable to criminal
prosecution, but it seems never to have been held that the child
might maintain a personal action for his injury. In principle
there seems to be no reason why such an action should not be
sustained; but the policy of permitting actions that thus invite
the child to contest the parents' authority is so questionable,
that we may well doubt if the right will ever be sanctioned." 4
However, another authority has taken the opposite view:
"The parent has a right to govern his minor child; and, as
incident to this, he must have power to correct him. The
maxim is, that he has power to chastise him moderately. The
exrecise of this power must be, in a great measure, discretionary.
He may so chastise his child as to be liable in an action by the
child against him for a battery. The child has rights which the
law will protect against the brutality of a barbarous parent.
• . . For error of opinion, he ought to be excused; but for
malice of heart, he must not be shielded from the just claims
of the child."'
Despite this confusion, the greater number of courts have accepted
the rule to be that no cause of action was allowed; not because of any
direct authority to that effect but simply because of the absence of
any authority to the contrary.
III. PRESENT MAJORITY VIEW
The majority of the American courts hold that an unemancipated
minor child has no cause of action for personal injuries inflicted upon
it by its parent. The first reported case, directly in point, in which this
ding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).3 BROWNE, DOMESTIc RELATIONS p. 75 (2d ed. 1890).
4 CooLEY, TORTS p. 197 (2d ed. 1888).5 pEms, DOMEsTIc RELATIONS p. 420 (3d ed. 1862).
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question arose was Hewellette v. George.6 In that case, the plaintiff,
while a minor, had been wrongfully confined in an insane asylum by
her mother. Upon her release she brought an action for the injuries
sustained. The action was disallowed and the court stated:
"But so long as the parent is under obligation to care for,
guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation
to aid comfort and obey, no such action as this can be main-
tained." 7
It is to be noted that the Mississippi Court, in arriving at this de-
cision, cited no authority for its position. The court went on to say
that public policy and the interests of society forbid the minor child
civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hand of the parent.
The public policy involved being the maintenance of domestic tran-
quility. But can it be reasonably argued that tranquility exists when
the parent has inflicted injury upon the child to such a degree that
the child has seen fit to institute a lawsuit? It would appear that the
relationship which the court is so desirous of protecting is no longer
in existence.
Twelve years later the Tennessee Court was confronted with a
similar situation in McKelvey v. McKelvey." In holding that the action
was not allowable, the court followed the same line of reasoning as
the Hewellette case and cited it as its only authority.
The extreme which can be reached by the application of the
"public policy" doctrine can best be appreciated by reference to Roller
v. Roller.9 The defendant had been convicted of rape, committed upon
his fifteen (15) year old daughter. The daughter then commenced
an action to recover damages. The defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint was overruled and judgment was subsequently entered for the
plaintiff. On review by the Supreme Court of the State of Washing-
ton this judgment was reversed, the court holding that the demurrer
should have been sustained. In making its decision, the court made the
following statement:
"The rule of law prohibiting such suits between parent and
child is based upon the interest that society has in preserving
harmony in the domestic relations, an interest which has been
manifested since the earliest organization of a civilized gov-
ernment, an interest inspired by the universally recognized
fact that the maintenance of harmonious and proper family rela-
tions is conducive to good citizenship, and therefore works to
the welfare of the state."1
G68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7 id. at 887.
'111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.\V. 664 (1903).
9 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
10 Ibid.
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The court then considered the appellant's argument that any har-
monious relationship which had existed had been so rudely disturbed
that it could never again be re-established, and therefore, the reason
for the rule being non-existent, the rule does not apply.
That court admitted that, "There seems to be some reason in this
argument. . . .","1 but then went on to hold:
".... ,if it be once established that a child has a right to
sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarcation
which can be drawn, for the same principle which would allow
the action in the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved
in this case, would allow an action to be brought for any other
tort."12
However, the principle which would allow recovery in the case
of an intentional tort is not applicable where negligence is involved.
Thus the principle allowing the action would not allow an action to
be brought for any tort. Surely it is not too difficult to draw a line
between intentional torts and negligence; yet the court appears to be
saying just that! There does not seem to be any practical difficulty in
denying recovery in cases of negligence, yet allowing it in those cases
involving wilful and wanton conduct. If the triers of fact are able
to compare the percentage of negligence,'3 they certainly must be able
to distinguish between negligence and conduct which is willful and
wanton, or between conduct which disrupts family harmony and
that which does not.
The "public policy" argument appears to be the major reason
for refusing to allow a minor redress for parental-inflicted wrongs.
The idea being that the best interests of society are furthered by har-
monious domestic relations. That this premise is sound, there is no
dispute. But can the application of this principle be justified when
the harmonious family ties are irreparably broken and there exists an
uncompensated injury? Even granting that the family relations could
be adequately restored to the satus quo, is this more easily accomplished
when the injuries inflicted are left uncompensated?
The courts, however, in their consideration of this problem, have
not rested their decisions solely on the basis of public policy. Another
reason frequently advanced for the disallowance of a cause of action
is the "inheritance theory." That is, assuming that the action were al-
lowed and the child recovered a judgment, should the child then die,
the parent would become heir to the very property taken away from
him. 4 The basis of the theory is the mere possibility of the child's
death, rather than any immediate danger that the feared consequences
11 Ibid.
12Id. at 789.
1" Wis. STATS. §331.045 (1955).
1479 Pac. at 789.
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will occur. By this reasoning it would appear that the courts should
refuse to allow an action by any person against one who is his possible
heir. The inherent weakness of the "inheritance theory" is shown by
the fact that it has never been employed as the sole ground for denying
recovery, and the courts have never shown any tendency to put any
great reliance on its logic.
A third argument used to defeat the child's cause of action is the
"family exchequer" theory. The reasoning here is that the money of
the family should be held for the benefit of all the family.15 However
this same theory does not bar an action against the parent by a stran-
ger to the family relationship, in which case the benefits of the family
assets are withheld from the members of the family; nor does it apply
so as to require a minor child to distribute, among the family, any re-
covery received in an action against one not a member of the family.
The final argument advanced in denying the cause of action is the
analogy of the parent-child relationship with that of the husband-wife
relationship. The common law barred suits between husband and wife
because of the very nature of the relationship created by marriage:
"By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being as legal existence of the woman is sus-
pended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and con-
solidated into that of the husband . "..."16
Thus, by reason of this concept, to allow a husband, or wife, to
sue the other spouse would be to allow, in effect, a person to sue him-
self! While this may have been true as to suits between husband and
wife, no such similar relationship exists between parent and child. The
legal existence of parent and child are separate and distinct.
The majority of the American courts, then, have refused to allow
an unemancipated minor child a cause of action aganist its parents
for personal torts, regardless of the nature of the tort or the degree of
harm inflicted. This conclusion has been supported by one or more
of the following reasons: public policy, i.e., the maintenance of har-
monious family relationships; "inheritance theory," viz., should the
child die after recovering a judgment, the parent would be heir to the
very property taken from him; "family exchequer" theory, viz., the
money recovered by the child should be used for the benefit of all
the family and not just one: and finally, the analogy between the
common law relationship of husband and wife, i.e., the very relation-
ship existing between the parties precludes the possibility of a suit by
one agaist the other.
IV. PRESENT MINORITY VIEW
The first deviation from the rule laid down in Hewellette v. George
15 Ibid.
1( 1 CITTY'S BLACKSTONE 355 (1886); See Also: 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 180
(rev. ed. 1892).
[Vol. 41
COMMENTS
occurred in 1930. At that time, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in
Dunlap v. Dunlap,17 made the first break with the doctrine of paren-
tal immunity. The plaintiff was the defendant's minor son and was
working for the defendant at the time he received the injuries com-
plained of. Defendant had made a motion for nonsuit upon the ground
that a minor child cannot sue his parent for tort. Plaintiff excepted to
the granting of the motion and appealed the case. In a thoughtful
analysis of the problem and after a careful consideration of the reasons
advanced for non-liability, the court held as follows:
"The law does not make fetishes of ideas. It limits them to
their proper spheres. And so this concept of family life ought
not to be used as a cloak for intended wrongs. It is always to
be borne in mind that denial of recovery has not been put upon
the ground that the parent was not a wrongdoer. His conceded
wrong has not even been excused. He has escaped liability be-
cause it has been thought that a right of recovery would lead
to worse results. The child has been sacrificed for the family
good. Argument is not needed to sustain the thesis that such
a proposition be limited to cases clearly within the reason for the
rule."
This marks the first of a handful of decisions which have allowed
the minor a cause of action against its parent. While at first glance,
the paucity of decisions, from 1930 to the present, which have allowed
such actions would appear to be indicative of the fact that such
actions are viewed with disfavor, this is not the situation by any
means. Only three cases' 8 have been decided since that time in which
it was intimated that a minor would not have a cause of action against
its parent when an intentional tort is involved. However, of these
three, the first'19 has been impliedly overruled, 20 leaving only two cases,
since 1930, to support the non-liability doctrine-only one of which
actually involved conduct which was wilful and wanton.2 1
In considering the cases espousing the view that the unemancipated
minor child has a civil remedy against its parents for wilful and
wanton conduct it will perhaps be best to do so in light of the reasons
which have been advanced in favor of parental immunity.
The first, and most persuasive argument advanced for non-liability
is the public policy involved in the preservation of harmonious family
relations. There is no doubt as to the soundness of this basic premise.
The chief error into which the courts have fallen is simply that this
premise has no application in the case of a wilful and wanton act on
'L 84 N.H. 352 at 358, 150 AtI. 905, at 910 (1930).
'
8 Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Owens v. Auto
AMut. Indemnity Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937) ; Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo.
App. 994, 124 S.E.2d 675 (1939).
19 Chastain v. Chastain, see note 18 supra.20Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 727, 70 S.E. 2d 152 (1952).
21 Cook v. Cook, see note 18 supra
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the part of the parent. The more well reasoned decisions have recog-
nized this fact.
"But when, as in this case, the parent is guilty of acts
which show complete abandonment of the parental relation, the
rule giving him immunity from suit by the child, on the ground
that discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot logically
be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his par-
ental authority and privilege, including his immunity from suit.
Justice demands that a minor shall have a right of action against
a parent for injuries resulting from cruel and inhuman treat-
ment or for malicious and wanton wrongs. 22
In Emery v. Emery2 3 the California Court, in allowing a minor
to maintain the action made the following statement:
"While it may seem repugnant to allow a minor to sue his
parent, we think it more repugnant to leave a minor child with-
out redress for the damage he has suffered by reason of his
parent's wilful or malicious conduct. A child, like every other
individual has a right to freedom from such injury. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that an unemancipated minor may sue his
parent for a wilful or malicious tort.
These pronouncements are merely a modern application of the
common law maxim cessanti ratione legis cassat ipsa lex. 24 Common
sense alone shows the fallacy of the majority argument. If the act of
the parent is such that it disrupts family unity sufficiently enough to
compel the child to seek civil redress, it is most obvious that the
courts are chasing a "will-o'-the-wisp" when the cause of action is
denied on the grounds that its allowance would endanger family har-
mony. For in fact, there is no longer in existence any family har-
mony which is in need of protection! The classic example of such
inconsistency, of course, is Roller v. Roller.25 Unless the mores and
customs of the inhabitants of the State of Washington differ radically
from those of the majority of the American people it would appear
to be uncontroverted that the rape of a minor child by the father is an
act sufficient to disrupt harmonious family relations to a point beyond
repair. The quick reply of the proponents of the doctrine of non-lia-
bility-that a practical line of demarcation cannot be drawn-is
equally absurd. Is it too difficult to distinguish between negligence on
the one hand and wilful and wanton conduct on the other? Is such
not the very function of a jury? Such problems are encountered every
day in the criminal courts, yet there has been no clamor to refuse the
22 Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 1, at 3, 77 A.2d 923, at 926 (1951).
2345 Cal. App. 2d 421, at 428, 289 P.2d 218, at 224 (1955) ; followed in, Perkins
v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App.2d 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956). For statements of
similar import see: Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Il. App.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525
(1956) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
24 When the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself ceases.
25 See note 9 supra.
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state the right to prosecute because, for example, the line between or-
dinary negligence and negligence to a high degree is too difficult to
ascertain.26
Even assuming that it would be exceedingly difficult to "draw
a line," is that a valid reason for disallowing redress? Are we to deny
the right to recovery merely because of difficulty of proof?
There is another patent defect in the reasoning behind the public
policy argument. This is exemplified by those courts which deny the
action on the grounds of public policy and then go on to state that
the minor child will be protected by the state, through its criminal
laws. 27 Such statements negate the very essence of the public policy
argument. Are harmonious family relations to be preserved by re-
fusing to allow the minor to institute a civil suit and at the same time
putting the offending parent in jail? It would appear that the latter
course of action is accomplishing the very result which the courts
fear so much.
The inconsistency of the public policy argument is further shown
by the fact that minors have always been allowed a cause of action
against their parents in order to protect their property rights.28 This
inconsistency was quite clearly pointed out in Wells v. Wells :29
"It may be that an action in tort by a parent against his
min"or child would introduce discord and contention into the
home, but it is equally true that an action involving right in
property, strictly speaking, brought by the parent aganist his
minor child, would introduce discord and contention into the
home and tend to disrupt the family relation, but it will not be
claimed that the law forbids such action."
Are a minor's property rights to be considered more sacred than
his personal rights? In effect, this is to say that if a parent commits
even a technical trespass upon lands held by his child, the child will
have civil redress for damages; but if that same father cruelly flogs
his infant child, the child has no civil redress and is entitled to no
compensation for his injuries. This is precisely the stand taken
by the majority of the American courts today!
In allowing the unemancipated minor a cause of action against
its parent, the courts have not been concerned with the "inheritance"
and "family exchequer" theories,30 which have been advanced as rea-
26 WIs. STATS. §940.08 (2) (1955).
27 Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Cook v. Cook, see
note 18 supra, Roller v. Roller, see note 9 supra.2 8 Duke of Beaufort v. Berty, 1 P. Wins. 705, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (1721) ; Lamb
v. Lamb, 146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895); Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Atk. 489,
26 Eng. Rep. 310 (1737) ; Roberts v. Roberts, Hadres 96, 145 Eng. Rep. 399
(1655); Thomas v. Thomas, 2 K&J. 79, 69 Eng. Rep. 701 (1855).
2948 S.W. 2d 109, at 111 (K.C., Mo., Ct. of App. 1932).
30 Discussed Above.
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sons for denying liability. Such arguments being inconsequential and
of no great weight even in the reasoning of the majority.
The fourth argument advanced in support of the rule of non-lia-
bility is the alleged analogy between husband and wife. In considering
this argument, the court held, in WVorrell v. Worrell:31
"We do not think that the suggested analogy of husband
and wife to that of parent and child affords support for the rule.
The distinction is clear. The relation of husband and wife is
created by law, that of parent and child by nature. While at
common law, and except as changed by statute, there is a con-
ception of legal unity of husband and wife, neither at common
law nor under our statute is there a conception of the legal
identity of parent and minor child, either in their persons or
in their property rights."
That the analogy drawn is invalid can readily be seen by reference
to the previous mentioned fact that at common law a minor could
sue its parent in matters concerning property rights. 32 Were the re-
lationship between parent and child identical with that of husband
and wife-as is assumed by the majority position-such suits would
have been barred just as the wife was barred from maintaining a suit
aganist her husband. The allowance of such action is clear proof that
there was no common law concept of legal identity betweenparent
and child.
A growing minority of American courts have refused to be bound
by the precedent established by poor reasoning on the part of the
earlier courts. A concise statement of the minority view is given in
the recent Illinois case of Nudd v. Matsoukas,33 in which the court
held:
"Any justification for the rule of parental immunity can be
found only in a reluctance to create litigation and strife between
members of the family unit. While this policy might be such
justification to prevent suits for mere negligence within the
scope of the parental relationship we do not conceive that public
policy should prevent a minor from obtaining redress for wilful
and wanton misconduct on the part of a parent. To tolerate
such misconduct and deprive a child of relief will not foster
family unity but will deprive a person of redress, without any
corresponding social benefit, for an injury long recognized at
common law . . . . We do not feel that the announcement of
this doctrine should be left to the legislature. The doctrine of
parental immunity, as far as it goes, was created by the courts.
It is especially for them to interpret and modify that doctrine
to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and
social needs."
31 174 Va. 11, at 15, 4 S.E.2d 343, at 345 (1939).
32 See note 28 supra.
337 Il1. App.2d 608, at 617, 131 N.E.2d 525, at 531 (1956).
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In recent years,3 4 there has not been one instance of an appellate
court denying an unemancipated minor a cause of action against its
parent for wilful and wanton misconduct. The cases are numerous,
however, which have denied the child a cause of action for simple
negligence. It is significant however, that these decisions, for the most
part, have expressly reserved the question as to whether or not a
cause of action would lie for wilful and wanton misconduct,35 either
by express statement or by a direct specification that the reason the
action does not lie is that only simple or ordinary negligence is in-
volved. This is at least indicative of the fact that the courts are recog-
nizing that a distinction is to be made between negligence and wilful
and wanton misconduct, as affecting the child's cause of action against
its parent.
V. WISCONSIN'S POSITION
As of yet, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been faced with
the precise problem in question.3 6 In actions for negligence, however,
the cause of action on the minor's behalf has been expressly disallowed.
The first case so holding was Wick v. Wick 3 '7 in which the court made
a general holding that an infant child could not maintain a tort action
against the parent. Justice Crownhart, however, filed a vigorous dis-
sent attacking the logic upon which the majority decision was based. As
authority for his position he relied upon the Wisconsin Constitution.38
"Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for
all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and
without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws."
It was pointed out, in the dissent, that the above mentioned sec-
tion makes as the supreme law of the State of Wisconsin, the common
law maxim: Ubi jus ibi remedium.3 9 (Disregarding, for the moment,
the controversy as to the common law view). This being true, and there
being no distinction made by the Constitution, in this particular provi-
sion, between property and personal rights, there is absolutely no jus-
tification for refusing the minor a cause of action against his parent,
sounding in tort, and yet allowing that same minor a cause of action
against the same parent-in order to protect his property rights. This
view however, has never been accepted by the Wisconsin Court. In
34 Since Cook v. Cook, see note 18 supra, decided in 1939.
35 Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
V. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932); Securo v. Securo, 110 W Va. 1, 156 S.E.
750 (1931). In some instances, saying that the action would lie in such cases:
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W. 2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Siembab v.
Siembab, 284. App Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954).
36 See: 13 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN DIGEST, Parent and Child §10.
37 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
38 WIs. CONsT., art. 1, §9.
39 There is no wrong without a remedy.
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the recent case of Wadoz v. Nat. Indemnity Co.,40 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its position that no action for negli-
gence will lie between a parent and his or her unemancipated minor
child.
In the Wick case it was stated that the action in question was pro-
hibited at common law and the Court refused to extend the doctrine
of Wait v. Pierce,41 in which a wife was allowed to sue her husband
in tort. Thus it would appear from this that even if the Wisconsin
Court were inclined to grant the minor a cause of action it could not;
for if the common law is in force in the state of Wisconsin, 2 and if
the action were prohibited at common law as the Court seemed to de-
cide, such prohibition would be law in Wisconsin thereby necessitating
any change to come from the legislature. This was substantially the
holding in Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik,43 in which the Court held
that whether or not such action should be permitted is a question of
public policy for the legislature and not for the courts. 44
This argument, however, falls short of settling the question to the
great degree of certainty which its proponents claim. While the com-
mon law is applicable in Wisconsin, it is so only to the extent reason-
ably applicable to our situation and government. 45 Might not Art. I,
Sec. 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution be said to overrule any common
law prohibition against the minor's cause of action-if there ever was
such a prohibition? The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Schwanke v.
Garlt,46 has stated that the common law is in force in this state only so
far as it is consistent with the Constitution. Therefore, assuming the
common law to be that the minor child had no cause of action against
its parent and applying to that premise the reasoning of Justice Crown-
hart, does it not follow that such common law view could be of no
force and effect in this state as it is inconsistent with the previously
quoted constitutional provision?
It would appear then, that if the precise problem of a parent's wil-
ful and wanton misconduct is ever placed before the Court, there is
nothing to prevent it from deciding that the unemancipated minor
does have a cause of action and rendering its judgment accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
In spite of the early doctrine enunciated in the Hewellette", case,
which remained firmly entrenched until 1930, the modern view seems
40274 Wis. 383, 80 N.W.2d 262 (1956).
41191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926), rehearing denied 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
4 Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 (1864).
43 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948).
44Compare with the statement made by the Illinois court in Nudd v. Matsoukas,
note 33 supra.
45 Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903).46219 Wis. 367, 263 N.W. 176 (1935).
4 See note 6 supra.
[Vol. 41
COMMENTS
to be to allow the unemancipated minor a cause of action for injuries
sustained as a result of its parent's wilful and wanton misconduct. The
recent decisions have taken a fresh view of the problem and discarded
the archaic reasoning and blind precedent which had formerly pre-
vailed in the earlier decisions. Whether or not the allowance of the
minor's cause of action is still a minority view is doubtful as a great
number of those states which have not allowed the action to be main-
tained for simple or ordinary negligence, have expressly reserved their
decision as to wilful and wanton misconduct, awaiting that precise issue
to be rasied. Their actual decisions on the problem, however, cannot
be ascertained until such time.
The most recent authority to take a stand on the issue has come
out in favor of allowing the child a cause of action .
4
"A more penetrating analysis into these problems may result
in the application of what, it is submitted, is a more desirable
principle, namely, to allow the action either by a parent or a
child in every case in which it is reasonably clear that the do-
mestic peace has already been disturbed beyond repair or where
by reason of the circumstances it is not imperiled, and where
the reasonableness of family discipline is not involved."
Wisconsin's position is extremely doubtful, as it does not appear
that the Court has ever made any distinction between negligence on
the one hand, and wilful and wanton conduct on the other, in cases
of this type-although it must be borne in mind that the problem has
not yet presented itself in this jurisdiction. Until such time as it does
it can only be said that Wisconsin law, in its present state, would refuse
to entertain the child's plea.
JAMES T. BAYORGEON
48 1 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS §8.11 (1956).
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